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Introduction 
In recent years one of the most interesting features of the field of religious 
studies has been the resurgence of the focus on the role of religion within 
the political world. Many scholars now recognize that earlier assumptions, 
at least in Western academic circles, that religion would largely fade from 
political life have not been borne out. On the contrary, instead of a gradual 
marginalization and privatization of religion, in many parts of the world 
the opposite has occurred. Even in the West, religion has retained or even 
reasserted its presence in public debate. 
The result has been a substantial reassessment of the relationship of reli­
gion and politics in the modern world. A great number of studies have ap­
peared examining the way in which religious phenomena - ideas, symbols, 
individuals, institutions - influence systems of governance at local, nation­
al and international Ievels. Equal attention is now being given to the way 
in which the political system - Jeaders and institutions - responds to these 
claims. In short, the issue of the relationship between religion and politics 
is now a matter of serious academic attention. There is a growing recogni­
tion that religion and politics are not now, and in fact never have been, sep­
arate, hermetically-sealed spheres of human thought and action. In the mod­
ern world, albeit in different ways from earlier times, religion and politics 
continue to interlink in important ways in order to shape the public arena 
in which the many issues about the human predicament are debated and 
acted upon. 
But in which sense and to what end are religion and politics connected 
with each other? We know different stories, e.g., in the history of Christi­
anity, about this connection, and different models are discussed in the stud-
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ies of religion. For example, there is the story of modemity with its con­
nection to democracy or to a certain kind of arrangement between the state 
and religious organizations within a society. Of course, it makes a differ­
ence whether the question is about the relationship of religion and politics 
in general or about the constellation of relationships between a certain reli­
gion and the political sphere in a certain country during a specific histori­
cal period. 
Now, what can Schleiermacher contribute to this issue with his Speech­
es on Religion? lt is often said that Schleiermacher's concept of religion 
had a strong influence on the narrative of the privatization of religion, its 
disappearing from the public sphere and the secularization of society. In 
the fourth speech, Schleiermacher emphasized indeed that church and state 
should be separate. In his understanding, Church and state have different 
functions within a society. The purpose of the Church as a religious com­
munity is religious communication, which should not have direct impact 
on state issues. The state, too, should not intervene in the inner affairs of 
the church. And this seems to match up with Schleiermacher's notion of 
religion as something which is neither acting nor knowing. 
Nevertheless, Schleiermacher held the view that there are always specif­
ic tensions between religion and politics, using both of these terms in a 
broader sense. Schleiermacher also Stated that the general term 'religion' is 
always contaminated by normative standpoints and specific religious and 
political interests. For him, therefore, it would not be surprising to find that 
our understanding of religion is always impacted by the power of religious 
and political institutions. On Schleiermacher's view, the general concept of 
religion has to be read from the perspective of the Christian religion and its 
history. 
However scholars of theology and - I suppose - also of religious studies 
cannot abandon the general usage of 'religion'. On the contrary, they bave 
to reflect on their usage of the term hermeneutically. Only then can we rec­
ognize the specific profile of Schleiermacher's theory of religion as devel­
oped in the Speeches regarding the relationship between religion and poli­
tics. 
lt is obvious that we have to read the Speeches from the perspective of 
the fourth and fifth speeches. The focus of the Speeches in general is the 
Christian religion, its self-understanding and its community within the 
Christian Church. The development of the general understanding of reli­
?ion in the second speech, therefore, must be read in light of what is sai� m the later speeches. There, Schleiermacher argued that there is no "reh­
gion-in-general", rather there are only positive religions. Each definition of 
the term 'religion' thus stands under the presupposition of a specific reli­
gion and its tradition. Thus it should also become clear that each definition 
of religion has a normative implication, which cannot be conceived of 
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without looking at the status of this religion within the society and its in­
teraction with the political power. We know tbat in Schleiermacher's time 
the Christian religion was the religion of the overwhelming majority in the 
Prussian state. Furthermore, for Schleiermacher the Christian religion from 
a theological perspective represented the fulfillment not only of the history 
of religions but also of the creation of humankind. 
Nevertheless, the great achievement of Schleiermacher's Speeches was 
that he responded to the new challenge of theology initiated by the decon­
struction of the dogmas of the Christian faith in the enlightenment era. 
Schleiermacher recognized that in the new intellectual situation it was nec­
essary to explain not only what the Christian faith believes but also what it 
means for human beings to become a believer in the first place and to be­
come part of a religious community. In such an intellectual atmosphere, 
theologians and religious scholars have to develop a rational theory of reli­
gion. They have to explain the rational grounds for a religious position and 
worldview. They have to determine the function of religious communities 
within a society and for the individual human being. And they have to do 
that from the perspective of an outsider, although they may at the same 
time be included in the particular religious traditions and communities of 
that society. 
This is the post-enlightenment situation in which theologians are con­
fronted with the critique of religion and in which they have to find a ration­
al ground of reJigion. To do so, they need a general definition of religion 
and an understanding of its anthropological and societal function apart 
from its application to any particular religious tradition or community. In 
tbe Speeches Schleiermacher was one of the first theologians to meet these 
�equirements. Although he realized that bis understanding of religion was 
1nfluenced by bis Christian perspective, he developed a general theory of 
religion explaining what it means for human beings to be religious. 
In terms of the debate about the interrelationship of religion and poli­
tics, the approach that Schleiermacher takes in bis Speeches is still impor­
tant today. Not only does he describe the complicated development of this 
relationship, but he also helps us understand the specific religious dimen­
sion in political affairs. For this, of course he must give us the clarification 
of the term 'religion' and an overarching general theory of religion with 
insights about its rational grounds and its human and societal functions. 
With this in mind, we should Iook more in detail at Schleiermacher's ar­
guments regarding the relationship of religion and politics in modern so­
cieties by discussing Ted Vial's paper on religion and politics in this vol­ume. 
Vial first refers to the discourse about the use of the term 'religion' within the discipline of religious studies. He indicates that important repre­sentatives of religious studies like Talal Asad and Robert Orsi are critical 
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about Jose Casanova's thesis concerning the openness of the public sphere 
in modern societies to the political statements of religious communities. 
Inspired by Foucault's discourse-theory, they argue that in certain societies 
not all religions are publicly accepted. On the contrary, this openness is 
connected to the claim that public discourse accepts the valid political 
norms in a certain society. A religion with access to the public sphere has 
to be a generally accepted religion. Moreover, even in the theoretical and 
theological discourse one could clairn that the application of the term 'reli­
gion' to a cornmunity is always influenced by these normative political cri­
teria. Therefore, Asad and Orsi put forward a highly critical approach in 
dealing with the general term 'religion' within the field of religious stu­
dies. 
The openness of modern societies to the impact of a certain religion is 
connected to its cultural and, ultimately, theological standards. A religion 
with access to the public sphere has to be compatible with the major reli­
gion and its theology - and theology is always normative, as Asad and Orsi 
understand it. Already in this theoretical context, one might observe that 
the application of the term 'religion' to a community is influenced by nor­
mative theological and political interests. So they ask, e.g., for which pur­
poses a community is considered to be religious or non-religious. Vial re­
fers to the hesitation of religious stitdies scholars to accept and to use the 
modern term 'religion' as a descriptive category. He mentions that Asad 
and Orsi are skeptics about the general term 'religion'. In their opinion, 
which seems to be common in the field of religious studies, there is no 
such thing as "religion". There are only different religions, i.e., those 
people who identify themselves as members of a religious group, like Chri­
stians, Muslims, and so on. Asad and Orsi express the suspicion that there 
is a great danger ofthe ideological misuse ofthe general term 'religion' to 
further political interests. Given the thesis of Casanova and others that in 
modern liberal democracies religions are once again welcome to enter the 
public sphere, Asad and Orsi indicate that however accurate this claim is, 
it is not true for all religions in a certain society. Political interests are al­
ways involved, and every society incorporates more or less publicly ac­
cepted and established religions and therefore religions with more or less 
access to the public sphere. Consequently, following Asad and Orsi, one 
can say that only those religions can become public religions which con­
form to the political mainstream and something like the ideological groun­
ding ofthe political power. Religions range on different levels, but in order 
to be present in the public sphere of modern societies they have to fulfill 
specific political criteria. 
lt seems to me that it is the intention of the first part of Vial's paper to 
point out this critical and deconstructive discussion of the modern category 
of religion in the discipline of religious studies and furthermore to find 
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some helpful suggestions about the interpretation of Schleiermacher's 
Speeches. If I understand Vial correctly, then, in the later parts of bis paper 
he is affirming the critical deconstruction of modern theories of religion, 
using Schleiermacher's Speeches as a tool. He agrees with the dominant 
trend in religious studies by attempting to show that the modern term 'reli­
gion' does not refer to a constitutive dimension of human nature. For this 
reason, he emphasizes that the interpretation of Schleiermacher's Speeches 
fails if we link bis theory of religion primarily to the second speech. 
In the second speech, we find indeed something like an anthropological 
concept of religion. There, the essence of religion is described as "sensibil­
ity and taste for the infinite" or as "intuition of the universe", definitions of 
the general term religion which seem only to refer to individual human 
subjectivity and not to the religious community as a whole. Looking to the 
second speech, it also seems obvious, that for Schleiermacher religion is a 
dimension of human subjectivity per se apart from its political aspects or 
influence from the social sphere. Looking ahead, however, to the fourth 
and fifth speeches, Vial argues, we can see that Schleiermacher applies the 
term 'religion' (in the singular) to the different religions (in the plural). 
And in this respect, Vial is right: In the fourth and fifth Speeches Schleier­
macher is indeed talking about the Church and how the Christian commu­
nity can become a Church, and also about the difference between Christi­
anity and Judaism. He thus develops a concept which helps differentiate 
religions on a structural level. 
In so doing, Vial argues, we can see that Schleiermacher is using the 
term 'religion' in a normative sense. Vial seems to want to emphasize the 
idea that the explanation for Schleiermacher 's "ranking" of the various re­
ligions must have something to do with their particular relationship to the 
politics of the contemporary state and society. 
Using other Schleiermacher texts written around 1800, Vial demon­
strates how Schleiermacher uses normative political criteria to answer the 
question of whether indigenous religions in the colonies or Judaism in the 
Germany of bis time are compatible with the rules of the contemporary so­
ciety and the laws of the state. Thus in the end, Vial is able to underline the 
main argument of the critical approach of the field of religious studies that 
the term 'religion' in the singular is an ideological category masking polit­
ical interests and is, in the end, an instrument for political power and force. 
However, it seems to me that Vial confirms the position of Asad and 
Orsi in terms of their critical deconstruction of the general term of religion 
a little too much - and in a way that is not actually compatible with Schlei­
ermacher's approach. My first critical question is whether we have to ac­
cept that the general term 'religion' is only an ideological category, as 
claimed in the field of religious studies. lt is true that the term 'religion' 
has its historical, cultural and social contexts. One need only look at the 
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modern history of European Christianity to see this. However, I think that 
this modern history reflects a transformation of the Christian religion itself 
in which both modern Christian theology and the philosophy of religion 
has been involved. I would like to suggest that it is important to understand 
the recent development of the general term 'religion' in theology and phi­
losophy in order to understand what this term means and to wbich pbenom­
ena it was originally applied. Then we can see that the transformation of 
the Christian religion reflected in the rise of the general term 'religion' can 
also be understood as a social reality. Religious motives and symbols are 
not only used for political purposes. lt is also possible to read the modern 
European history of Christian religion as a process of freeing religion from 
is social, moral and especially political usage - a historical process of free­
ing religion to be itself. 
I agree with Vial that the critical approach of religious studies can be 
helpful for approaching Schleiermacher's theory of religion in the Speech­
es critically. However, Vial ought also to put the question the other way 
around. I think we can also ask whether Scbleiermacher's tbeory of reli­
gion in the Speeches can serve as an impetus for a better understanding of 
the development of the modern term 'religion' and its application to social 
phenomena and developments in modern societies. So my question to Vial 
is whether he is looking strongly enough at the interdependency of the evo­
lution of religion as a dimension of human subjectivity and the develop­
ment of modern liberal and democratic societies. I think that be is overlook­
ing the fact that in the Speeches Scbleiermacher develops a modern theory 
of religion.1 Schleiermacber is trying to create an understanding of the gen­
eral term 'religion' that is flexible and broad enough to cover such phe­
nomena like individual religions, which are primarily personal and private 
and in a specific sense also influence the public sphere. Schleiermacher's 
intention in the Speeches was to disclose the transformed modern under­
standing of religion - that there is something like religious experience that 
forms the basis for a religious community but refers at the same time to 
subjectivity. The individual religious person articulates bis or her religious 
experience. In this respect, eacb religious individual is related to the sym­
bolic tradition of a specific religion and thus to a religious community. 
Here, Schleiermacher is developing an idealistic concept of a true religious 
community. But at the same time, bis religious ideal was intended to repre­
sent the political possibility of realizing the lessons of the French revolu­
tion. Never again should the state and the political sphere of society be­
come the decisive factor in the Church' s access to the public sphere. On 
1 Cf. ULRICH BARTH, Die Religionstheorie der Reden. Schleiermachers theologisches 
Modernisierungsprogramm, in: ULRICH BARTH, Aufgeklärter Protestantismus, Tübingen 
2004, 259-290. 
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the contrary, Schleierrnacher was fighting for a transformation of the Prot­
estant Church through which the Church would exercise a significant influ­
ence on the genesis of the modern democratic society. For this reason, I 
would like to stress the fact not only that political forces have the power to 
regulate the presence of a religion in the public sphere but also that reli­
gion can transforrn the public sphere and thereby have a deep political im­
pact. 
My second question to Vial is whether it really is wise to concentrate on 
the fourth and fifth speeches discussing Schleiermacher's ideas about the 
contemporary relationship of religion and politics. In the second speech 
Schleiermacher gives bis description of the essence of religion and devel­
ops bis central argumentation conceming the independence and autonomy 
of religion as a sphere of human life in its own right. The justification of 
religion as a constitutive element of human nature, an argument which 
connects the theory of religion with an anthropological background, is on 
my view the most important contribution of Schleiermacher's Speeches -
even in terrns of the relationship between religion and politics. 2 Perhaps it 
will be helpful to remember in this regard that in bis Philosophische Ethik 
- which is truly a theory of culture - Schleiermacher was mainly interested 
to show how the social world is functionally differentiated. Religion, eco­
nomics and politics represent different social systems. They are autono­
mous on the one band and connected with each other in processes of inter­
penetration on the other. Thus, the ideological understanding of the general 
term 'religion' is not apt for a critique of Schleiermacher's concept. On the 
contrary, Schleiermacher was one of the first religious thinkers who under­
stood the interrelatedness of religion and politics within the society. But 
bis concept is also able to show that as religion has an impact on the politi­
cal sphere. 
There is another reason why the second speech is important for under­
standing Schleiermacher's thinking about the relationship between religion 
and politics. In the second speech Schleiermacher tries to understand reli­
gion as a specifically human experience - as intuition and feeling and 
therefore as something which is specifically related to human subjectivity, 
the principal condition for seif- and world-contact. In this regard, it is im­
portant for our discussion to see that Schleiermacher strongly argues that 
religion is not merely a derivational and secondary factor in the social 
word. To understand religion means to refer to religious experiences. Thus, 
2 Cf. WILHELM GRAB, Schleiennacher's Conception of Theology and Account of Re­
ligion as a Constitutive Element of Human Culture, in: Brent Sockness, Wilhelm Gräb 
(Ed:) Schleiennacher, the Study of Religion and the Future of Theology. A Transatlantic 
Dialogue. Berlin/New York 2010, 335-348. 
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experience provides the theoretica/ background for a theoretical justifica­
tion of being religious. 
Because the field of religious studies is not interested in such a theoreti­
cal justification of religious experiences, they are unable to deal with reli­
gious phenomena in any way other than a critical and deconstructive way. 
However, denying a constructive hermeneutics of religion makes it diffi­
cult to analyze religious self-understanding. And without a religious her­
meneutics, it should also be difficult to understand the social importance of 
religious movements and communities in a constructive way. In order to 
criticize religion as an ideological instrument in the hand of politicians, we 
first have to ask what religion is or what makes human beings able to be­
come religious. This is what I would like to discuss not only with Vial but 
also Asad and Orsi. On my view, it is very important to recognize that in 
his Speeches Schleiermacher argues that religion opens up a specific pers­
pective on the world and its reality. Religion provides the power to cope 
with specific challenges of way human beings conduct their lives.3 
My third and final question refers to Ted Vial's point that in the fourth 
and fifth speeches Schleiermacher is using the general term 'religion' in a 
normative sense restricting the public presence of religion to within the 
borders of the Prussian state. This may be true, but what does it imply? 
The Protestant Church within the Prussian state was highly connected 
with the political sphere. The king was at the same time the leader of the 
Church, not formally in a religious sense but for organizational reasons. 
This was a difficult relationship, and the <langer was always that the king 
would interfere with the religious dimension of the Church. But Schleier­
macher was fighting against these interferences. In the fourth speech he 
emphasizes that Church and state should be more separate. His purpose in 
this regard was that the church should become more religious and the state 
more political. That was what he was struggling for. And here again we 
can see his commitment to the autonomy of the different functions of so­
ciety. With this in mind we can also understand why in the fifth speech 
Schleiermacher stresses that there are restrictions for religions entering the 
public political sphere. These restrictions have to do with differences be­
tween religion and politics in principle. 
Even when we use the term 'politics' in a broader sense, Schleiermacher 
would say that politics is always a matter of the organization of the life of 
a community. In his Philosophische Ethik he refers to politics under the la­
bet of organizational action (organisierendem Handeln). Religion, in con­
trast, belongs to symbolizing action (symbolisierendem Handeln). When 
3 Cf. WILHELM GRAB, Practical Theology as Theology of Religion. Schleiermacher's 
Understancling of Practical Theology as a Discipline, in: International Journal of Practical 
Theology 9, 2005, 181-196. 
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religion is religion and nothing else, it is the deepest experience of person­
al self-transcendence. lt is a feeling which brings an individual person in 
contact with his or her present self-consciousness which can never become 
an object of knowing and acting. 
To understand Schleiermacher's impact on the debate about religion and 
politics correctly, we have to go back again to the anthropological frame­
work. Religion and politics address different functions of human existence 
and thus also different functions within a human society. Yet what is prin­
cipally different might not be differentiated within social reality. Schleier­
macher indicates that religious feelings usually accompany human actions. 
Because religion in its specific sense does not produce knowledge or ac­
tions, religious feelings cannot provide objects of knowledge or aims of 
actions. Nevertheless, religious feelings are fundamental to knowing and 
acting, because they form the identity of the person who knows or acts. 
The same is true regarding the religious sphere within a society. Religious 
or faith-based communities can and should enter the public sphere. But by 
doing so they become political agents and therefore no longer serve as reli­
gious agents. They then must resort to moral and political arguments in or­
der to promote their purposes. 
Finally, Schleiermacher emphasizes his claim that religions should be­
come more religious and the state more political. This allows us to under­
stand his critique of Judaism in the fifth speech, which suggests that Judaism 
- and we can add any other religion here - remains a political and theocratic 
religion within modern society. In this regard we have to understand the 
argument that not all religions "fit" within modern societies. Schlei­
ermacher' s intention was not to prevent these religions from having access 
to the public sphere as religions. But he was afraid that they might become 
dangerous political agents if they were to address political issues, unless 
they became pure political actors using solely rational political arguments. 
His point was that a religion which doesn 't respect the laws of the state but 
has theocratic intentions is not compatible with a modern democratic so­
ciety. 
Conclusion 
A final word about the dialog between theology and religious studies from 
the perspective of Schleiermacher' s concept of religion as developed in the 
Speeches. I might be wrong here, but it seems to me that the deepest differ­
ence between these two disciplines concerns the fact that within religious 
studies the term 'religion' is always associated with a derivative social 
phenomenon. lt is suspected of masking political interests but at the same 
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time is not supposed to refer to a human or social reality which has its own 
and genuine right to be. Theology, on the contrary, is interested to show 
that religion is a reality which cannot be reduced to merely political or 
other social purposes. 
In order to decide which academic discipline is right we need to foster 
more discussion between them. Our meeting in Marburg represented a use­
ful contribution to this debate, I suppose. And I want to stress the fact that 
from a theological perspective Schleiermacher's Speeches are very helpful 
to this debate, especially because they provide arguments for the claim that 
religion refers in a specific way to a constitutive dimension of the human 
nature and at the same time of all human cultures. The modern evolution of 
human culture has made the specific anthropological function of religion 
evident. We are now in a position to see that religion has to do with the 
symbolic expression of human self-consciousness. In this function, religion 
cannot be replaced by other social activities. A critical approach like the 
one preferred by religious studies does not thereby become dispensable, 
but we should be aware of a phrase which is very often used there - "Reli­
gion is nothing but . . .  ". 
This kind of reductionism also misses the point in the debate about reli­
gion and politics. lt is true that religion often obscures purely political in­
terests, but it can also reveal the basic human needs that sometimes moti­
vate political action. Religious studies, too, need a theoretical justification 
of religion as a constitutive element of human nature and culture. And in 
this respect, religious studies scholars might benefit a great deal from 
Schleiermacher' s Speeches. 
